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Section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act and 43 C.F.R.
Part 417 Occupy the Field of Determination of Reasonable
Beneficial Use of Lower Colorado River Water
Jerome C. Muys1
I.

Introduction

The Summer 2008 issue of this journal contains an article2 challenging
the validity and precedential value of a 2003 order by the Secretary of the
Interior, acting through the Bureau of Reclamation, reducing the 3.1 million
acre-feet (“MAF”) of Lower Colorado River water ordered for delivery by
Imperial Irrigation District (hereinafter “IID”) in California for the 2003 water
year to 2.86 MAF and rescheduling delivery of approximately 250,000 acrefeet (AF) for that year to the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
and Coachella Valley Water District. The Secretary’s action was based on the
regulations at 43 C.F.R. Part 417 providing that the Secretarial contractual
water allocations made pursuant to section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project
Act of 1928 (hereinafter “BCPA”)3 are limited by reasonable beneficial use and
that IID had been wasting the rescheduled quantity.
IID sued to enjoin the Secretary’s reduction and her authority to do so
under Part 417.4 The district court granted a preliminary injunction and
remanded the case to the Secretary “for a de novo Part 417 review,” noting
that “one of the Court’s bases for preliminary injunction relief was the
Federal Defendants’ failure to comply with Part 417’s required procedures,”
and found that remand pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(D), was “appropriate for several reasons:”

1. The author is an attorney in Washington, D.C. He was a member of
the California Attorney General’s legal team in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963), and represented the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
in later stages of that litigation, which was concluded in 2006 by the Supreme
Court’s entry of a final consolidated decree. 547 U.S. 150 (2006).
2. David Osias and Thomas Hicks, 43 C.F.R. Part 417 Does Not Authorize Federal
Agency Adjudication of IID Beneficial Use of Colorado River Water, 14 HASTINGS WEST
NORTHWEST J. OF ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1499 (2008) [hereinafter “Osias and Hicks”].
3. 45 Stat. 1057, 1060, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617, 617d.
4. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Imperial Irrigation Dist.
v. United States, No. 03-CV-0069W (JFS) (S.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2003).
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First, the United States Supreme Court, in Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546 (1963), affirmed the Secretary of the Interior’s importance in
resolving both interstate and intrastate water disputes:
These several provisions, even without legislative history, are
persuasive that congress intended the Secretary of the Interior,
through [her] § 5 contracts, both to carry out the allocation of
the waters of the main Colorado River among the Lower Basin
States and to decide which users within each State would get water.
Id. at 580 (emphasis supplied). Second, the Supreme Court has also
explicitly held that state law does not control the Secretary’s
determination in apportioning water. See id. at 585-586 (“we hold that
the Secretary in choosing between users within each State and in
settling the terms of his contracts is not bound by the sections to follow
state law.”); see also Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980) (reaffirming the
holding in Arizona) (footnote omitted).5
IID subsequently filed an ex parte application for clarification of the
court’s remand order:
Plaintiff’s application asks whether the following three issues are
reserved for judicial determination until after the Federal Defendants’ de
novo Part 417 review is completed: (1) Part 417’s validity; (2) the
applicable standard of review; and (3) the applicable law. The Court
agrees with Plaintiff that none of the three aforementioned issues has
been adjudicated or is foreclosed from subsequent judicial review.6
The Bureau carried out a de novo adjudication and only slightly
modified its proposed reduction in deliveries to IID, but the dispute was
settled in October 2003 without resolution of the three above-referenced
issues. The Osias and Hicks article contends that the Secretary’s 2002 and
2003 actions were not authorized by Part 417 for the following reasons:
The authors conclude that Part 417 is not authority for agency
adjudication; no express preemptive federal legislation authorizes the
Secretary to render a reasonable beneficial use decision without
deference to California reasonable beneficial use determinations. The
Secretary’s reallocation of “permanently allocated” water disregarded
specific conflict-resolution procedures contained in the water supply
contract between the United States and the Imperial Irrigation District,

5.
6.
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violated federal preemption jurisprudence, and ignored Congressional
intent and purpose. The 2003 adjudication and unilateral reallocation lacked
legal foundation, contract compliance, and adjudicatory due process. Therefore, it
should not be regarded as valid precedent.7
This rebuttal contends that (1) Osias and Hicks misread both the
Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) and the
Court’s later decision in California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); (2)
Arizona v. California should be read as holding that section 5 of the BCPA
“occupied the field” of establishing and enforcing the terms and conditions
of the Secretarial contracts making the interstate and intrastate allocations
and entitlements of Lower Colorado River mainstream water to Arizona,
California, and Nevada and their water users; and (3) the Part 417 regulations
are a valid exercise of that authority. As to the alleged lack of “contract
compliance and adjudicatory due process,” this rebuttal notes that IID
obtained judicial review of the 2003 Secretarial decision under 5 U.S.C. § 702,
which leaves the door open for future judicial review, if necessary, and that
the district court’s action remanding that decision to remedy the alleged
denial of administrative due process also remains available and adequate.
II.

Section 5 of the BCPA Impliedly Occupied the Field of Contractual
Allocation and Use of Lower Colorado River Mainstream Water

With regard to the federal preemption issue, the Osias and Hicks article
briefly summarized three basic federal preemption doctrines:
Express preemption arises in the context of Congressional legislation
that unambiguously asserts federal authority and expressly prohibits state
activity in a particular legal domain. State regulation within the federallylegislated domain is expressly forbidden and all enforcement authority is
completely consolidated within federal control.
Field preemption is similarly based on an express or “dominant”
federal interest, but involves an implied intent to “occupy the field”
rather than the express prohibition of state activity.
Conflict preemption examines whether specific provisions of
federal law conflict with state law. State law that is in direct conflict
with, inconsistent with, or frustrates the implied intent and purpose of
Congressional action is nullified by the federal law if it cannot be
reconciled with the federal purpose.8

7.
8.

Osias and Hicks, supra note 2, at 1501 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1516 (footnotes omitted).
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It then concluded that:
Neither the Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA) nor any other
subsequent Congressional legislation or law regarding the Colorado
River expressly or impliedly preempts applicable state reasonable
beneficial use law.
Thus, a federal reasonable beneficial use
determination preempts state law only if a conflict preemption analysis
reveals an irreconcilable conflict between a federal purpose and state
law. Without a clear conflict, California reasonable, beneficial-use
decisions and control remain valid and beyond federal preemption.9
As discussed at pages 201-207 infra, the majority opinion in Arizona v. California by
Justice Hugo Black, who was a United States senator when the BCPA was under
consideration by Congress in 1927-1928, plainly belies that conclusion.
A. Congressional “Occupancy of the Field” Preemption of Reasonable
Beneficial Use Issues Under the BCPA
A more informative description of federal “occupancy of the field”
preemption under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution than is offered
by Osias and Hicks is set forth by Harvard Law Professor and constitutional law
scholar Lawrence H. Tribe in his constitutional law treatise:
[T]here is a third category of preemption, an amalgam of the first two,
within which states are deemed powerless to act because of a vacuum
deliberately, even if not expressly, created by federal legislation. In
such cases, any state or local action, however consistent its substantive
content might be with the content of relevant federal statutes, is held
invalid . . . because the federal legislative scheme announces, or is best
understood as implying, a jurisdictional purpose on the part of
Congress to occupy the field.
....
[I]f Congress has validly decided to “occupy the field” for the federal
government, state and local regulations within that field must be invalidated
no matter how well they comport with substantive federal policies.
....
[Although] an unambiguous declaration by Congress that it intends to
occupy a particular field up to the reach of its affirmative constitutional
authority must be treated as dispositive regardless of the nature of the
subject; state action in such a case is invariably preempted . . . Rare is
the case, however, where Congress makes the judicial task so simple. A
“clearly expressed” Congressional purpose will normally be devined

9.
200
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only through close analysis of the statute in question as applied in the
particular case.10
Professor Tribe’s comment reflects the collective view of the earliest
Supreme Court decisions applying the “field preemption” concept, e.g., Hines v.
Davidovitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947);
and Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), rehearing denied, 351 U.S. 934
(1956). In Hines, the Court held that the Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940
had “occupied the field” of immigration and thereby preempted the
Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act of 1939. The majority opinion was written
by Justice Black, later to write the majority opinion in Arizona v. California, who
explained that there was no easy formula for determining whether state law
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.”11 Rice cited Hines for the proposition that
an “[a]ct of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject.”12 Summing up the history of the doctrine’s
employment in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05 (1956), Chief Justice
Warren focused on three principal factors in making such a determination: (1)
pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme or other program; (2) whether
occupation of the field at issue was necessary for uniformity of the federal
program’s application; and (3) the potential for conflict between state law and
implementation of the federal program.
B. Arizona v. California13
The foregoing general guidelines, applied by Justice Black for the
majority in Arizona v. California, fully support the Court’s conclusion that
section 5 of the BCPA occupied the field of allocating Lower Colorado River
mainstream water to ultimate users and establishing the terms and
conditions for its use, including the requirement for reasonable beneficial
use of such allocations.
Justice Black provided the following backdrop for his discussion of the
genesis of the BCPA:
It is not surprising that the pressing necessity to transform the erratic
and often destructive flow of the Colorado River into a controlled and

10. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Vol. I, 1172, 1205,
1210-11 (3d ed. 2000).
11. 312 U.S. at 67.
12. 331 U.S. at 230.
13. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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dependable water supply desperately needed in so many States began
to be talked about and recognized as far more than a purely local
problem which could be solved on a farmer-by-farmer, group-by-group,
or even state-by-state basis, desirable as this kind of solution might
have been . . . .
....
The Fall-Davis Report, submitted to congress [in 1922] began by
declaring, “The control of the floods and development of the resources of the Colorado
River are peculiarly national problems . . . ” and then went on to give reasons
why this was so, concluding with the statement that the job was so big
that only the Federal Government could do it.14
The six years of congressional consideration of the Nation’s first major
multipurpose power, flood control, and water supply project were marked by
significant public policy and legal disputes: private versus public
development of the project’s power potential; states’ rights arguments by
Arizona and Nevada over the control of the waters to be impounded by the
project and the ownership of the riverbed lands where it would be located;
and differing views of the seven Colorado River Basin states as to the impact
the project would have on their interstate water rights and concerns about
potential claims by Mexico to Colorado River water conserved by the project.
Against that background, the Court concluded that Congress had determined
that the massive, unique interstate project to be constructed under the BCPA
would best be administered by the Secretary of the Interior in the regional
and national interest:
Allocation of Water Among the States and Distribution to Users.
We have concluded, for reasons to be stated, that Congress in passing the
Project Act intended to and did create its own comprehensive scheme for the
apportionment among California, Arizona, and Nevada of the Lower Basin’s share of
the mainstream waters of the Colorado River, leaving each State its tributaries.
....
Having undertaken this beneficial project, Congress, in several provisions of the Act,
made it clear that no one should use mainstream waters save in strict compliance with
the scheme set up by the Act. Section 5 authorized the Secretary “under such
general regulations as he may prescribe, to contract for the storage of
water in said reservoir and for the delivery thereof at such points on the
river . . . as may be agreed upon for irrigation and domestic uses . . . .” To
emphasize that water could be obtained from the Secretary alone, § 5 further declared,
“No person shall have or be entitled to have the use for any purpose of the water stored
as foresaid except by contract made as herein stated.”

14. Id. at 554 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
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....
These several provisions, even without legislative history, are
persuasive that Congress intended the Secretary of the Interior, through his § 5
contracts, both to carry out the allocation of the waters of the main
Colorado River among the Lower Basin States and to decide which users
within each State would get water. The general authority to make contracts
normally includes the power to choose with whom and upon what terms
the contracts will be made. When Congress in an Act grants authority
to contract, that authority is no less than the general authority, unless
Congress has placed some limit on it.15
The majority rejected the argument that sections 14 and 18 of the BCPA
intended to vest the allocation authority in the States:
Notwithstanding the Government’s construction, ownership, operation,
and maintenance of the vast Colorado River works that conserve and
store the river’s waters and the broad power given by Congress to the Secretary
of the Interior to make contracts for the distribution of the water, it is argued that
Congress in §§ 14 and 18 of the Act took away practically all the
Secretary’s power by permitting the States to determine with whom and
on what terms the Secretary would make water contracts.
....
In our view, nothing in any of these provisions affects our decision,
stated earlier, that it is the Act and the Secretary’s contracts, not the
law of prior appropriation, that control the apportionment of water
among the States. Moreover, contrary to the Master’s conclusion, we
hold that the Secretary in choosing between users within each State and in settling the
terms of his contracts is not bound by these sections to follow state law.
....
Where the Government, as here, has exercised this power and undertaken
a comprehensive project for the improvement of a great river and for the
orderly and beneficial distribution of water, there is no room for inconsistent state
laws. . . . [W]here the Secretary’s contracts, as here, carry out a congressional plan for
the complete distribution of waters to users, state law has no place.16
Noting the magnitude and benefits of the water supply program to be
carried out pursuant to the BCPA, Justice Black emphasized that “[i]t was only
natural that the United States, which was to make the benefits available and
which had accepted the responsibility for the project’s operation, would want

15. Id. at 564-65, 579-80 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 585-86, 587-88 (emphasis added).
203
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to make certain that the waters were effectively used.”17 Congress plainly determined
that vesting exclusive unitary control over the allocation of project water was
essential to achieve the “orderly and beneficial distribution of water” and to
insure that it was “effectively used,” i.e., put to non-wasteful, reasonable
beneficial use in arid Arizona, California, and Nevada. Stressing that the
development of the Lower Colorado River “could function efficiently only
under unitary management, able to formulate and supervise a coordinated
plan that could take account of the diverse, often conflicting interests of the
people and communities of the Lower Basin States,” he concluded:
Subjecting the Secretary to the varying, possibly inconsistent, commands of the
different state legislatures could frustrate efficient operation of the project and thwart
full realization of the benefits Congress intended this national project to bestow. We
are satisfied that the Secretary’s power must be construed to permit
him, within the boundaries set down in the Act, to allocate and
distribute the waters of the mainstream of the Colorado River.18
Justice Black pointed to section 6 of the Act as “one of the most
significant limitations in the Act,” which requires the Secretary “to satisfy
present perfected rights, a matter of intense importance to those who have
reduced their water rights to actual beneficial use at the time the Act became
effective,”19 evidencing his familiarity with the “beneficial use” requirement as
a traditional, critical component of the western state law of prior
appropriation.
In rejecting arguments that sections 14 and 18 of the BCPA made state
law controlling in determining reasonable beneficial use by incorporation of
section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, he noted that similar arguments
had been rejected in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958),
and City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963), and concluded that a
contrary result could not be justified in interpreting section 5 of the BCPA.20
Ivanhoe held that section 8 only required the Secretary to comply with state
law in acquiring water rights for reclamation projects, not in distributing such
acquired water. To the contrary, Justice Black’s majority opinion did not
suggest that the BCPA’s “comprehensive scheme” required Secretarial
acquisition of water rights from Arizona, Nevada, and California for the water
to be stored at Hoover Dam and diverted and distributed by the All-American
Canal to Imperial Valley, and the Secretary has never done so.

17.
18.
19.
20.
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As to section 18, the majority opinion concluded that it “merely
preserves such rights as the States ‘now’ have, that is, such rights as they had
at the time the Act was passed,” e.g., the laws under which the “present
perfected rights” in the natural flow of the Colorado preserved under section
6 had been established prior to 1929,21 as the Court later made clear in Bryant
v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980), infra. Other state laws potentially affecting
allocations of stored flood flows and the terms and conditions for their use
were superseded prospectively on the Lower Colorado River by passage of
the BCPA.
Osias and Hicks accurately recite most of the Court’s rationale for its
decision,22 but their surprising characterization of its significance wholly
misses the mark:
Arizona [v. California] significantly strengthened federal authority over
water allocation and distribution, and decisively tipped the balance
between state and federal in section 8 of the Reclamation Act towards
dominant federal control.23
Contrary to that assertion, the Arizona v. California decision plainly did
not enhance federal power under the Reclamation Act. Rather, it found that the
comprehensive federal program for development of the Lower Colorado River laid
out by the congressionally established contractual allocation formula under
the unique provisions of the BCPA could not be defeated by section 14’s
general incorporation of section 8 of the Reclamation Act, as narrowly
interpreted in Ivanhoe and Fresno.
Justice Rehnquist later recognized this distinction in California v. United
States24 in a tour de force opinion (apparently not clearly understood by Osias
and Hicks) rejecting the rationale of Ivanhoe and Fresno and disavowing what
he characterized as the dictum in Arizona v. California which the Court had
unnecessarily used to buttress its decision. His one paragraph disavowal
plainly recognized the independent basis for that decision (which Osias and
Hicks chose to ignore):
In Arizona v. California, the States had asked the Court to rule that state
law would control in the distribution of water from the Boulder Canyon
project, a massive multistate reclamation project on the Colorado
River. After reviewing the legislative history of the Boulder Canyon
Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617 et seq., the Court concluded that because of the

21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 587.
Osias and Hicks, supra note 2, at 1527-30.
Id. at 1530 (emphasis added).
438 U.S. 645 (1978).
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unique size and multistate scope of the Project, Congress did not intend the States to
interfere with the Secretary’s power to determine with whom and on what terms water
contracts would be made. While the Court in rejecting the States’ claim
repeated the language from Ivanhoe and City of Fresno as to the scope of
§ 8, there was no need for it to reaffirm such language except as it related to the
singular legislative history of the Boulder Canyon Project Act.25
Justice White, one of the five member majority in Arizona v. California,
also acknowledged the limited basis of that decision in his later opinion for
the Court in Bryant v. Yellen, addressing the status of “present perfected
rights” under section 6 of the BCPA:26
In Arizona v. California, we held that the Project Act vested in the
Secretary the power to contract for project water deliveries independent of
the direction of § 8 of the Reclamation Act to proceed in accordance with state law
and of the admonition of § 18 of the Project Act not to interfere with state law. 373
U.S. at 586-588, 83 S.Ct., at 1490-1491.21/ We nevertheless clearly
recognized that § 6 of the Project Act, requiring satisfaction of present
perfected rights, was an unavoidable limitation on the Secretary’s
power and that in providing for these rights the Secretary must take
account of state law. In this respect, state law was not displaced by the Project
Act and must be consulted in determining the content and
characteristics of the water right that was adjudicated to the [Imperial
Irrigation] District by our decree.22
* **
21
In terms of reclamation law generally, the impact of the Court’s
opinion in this respect was considerably narrowed in California v. United
States, 438 U.S. 645, 98 S. Ct. 2985, 57 L. Ed. 2d (1978), but the latter case
did not question the description of the Secretary’s power under the Project Act itself.
[Footnote in original].
22

While the source of present perfected rights is to be found in state
law, the question of whether rights provided by state law amount to
present perfected rights within the meaning of §6 is obviously one of
federal law. [Footnote in original, citations omitted]
It should be noted that the 2.84 MAF of Colorado River water that the
Bureau of Reclamation proposed to deliver to IID in 2003 was still some

25. Id. at 673-74 (emphasis added).
26. 447 U.S. 352, 370-71 (1980) (emphasis added). Osias and Hicks
relegate Justice White’s analysis of Arizona v. California and California v. United
States to a footnote and omit two important footnotes from his discussion.
See Osias and Hicks, supra note 2, at 1536-37, n.185.
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260,000 AF in excess of the “present perfected rights” decreed to IID by the
Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979).27
Osias and Hicks take almost three pages of difficult-to-fathom
argument to rationalize their contrary version of what they believed Justice
Rehnquist meant,28 all leading to four plainly erroneous concluding
characterizations of the legal effect of Arizona v. California and California v.
United States on the Secretary’s authority to impose reasonable beneficial use
conditions on section 5 contractors pursuant to Part 417,29 set out below with
comments in response.

27. Osias and Hicks, supra note 2, at 1536, n.183. In describing the State
Water Resources Control Board’s 2002 approval of the IID-SDCWA transfer,
Osias and Hicks assert that “the SWRCB specifically identified and dismissed
the legal basis for any federal beneficial use preemption as a limit on its own
beneficial use determination.” Id. at 1554. This is not an accurate
characterization of the portion of the SWCRB’s order cited in support of their
statement, i.e., “we need not resolve the [preemption] issue here because the
federal beneficial use requirement cannot be interpreted to limit IID’s ability
to use Colorado River water to mitigate impacts to the Salton Sea where IID is
using its present perfect[sic] rights in a manner consistent with state law.” Id.
(emphasis added). It did not address the issue of the applicability of a
Secretarial beneficial use standard to the 500,000 AF portion of IID’s contract
entitlement in excess of IID’s present perfected rights.
28. Id. at 1533-35. In their discussion Osias and Hicks refer to Arizona v.
California as “Arizona” and California v. United States as “California.”
The following excerpts of their version defy analysis:
The opinion in California discarded the distinction between
acquisition and distribution and undercut the decision in Arizona
that state law had no role when the BCPA and Reclamation Act were
reconciled alongside one another. On the contrary, the Reclamation Act
preempted the BCPA.
....
However, state authority still needed to be reconciled with the
Secretary’s express BCPA section 5 contract authority. The core issue
boiled down to the context and syntax of acquisition and distribution of water
within the Colorado River system and the broader reclamation program. The
immediate context at issue in the Arizona opinion was distribution by
the Secretary to interstate recipients, while the acquisition of the
water was expressly solved by Congress’s apportionment between
sibling states.
Id. at 1534-35 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 1537-38.
207
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[1] The Supreme Court addressed the section 5 contractual
authority of the Secretary related to interstate allocations of the
Colorado River in Arizona and the federal-state balance of section 8
authority in California.
As discussed above, California explicitly
disavowed dicta from two prominent section 8 cases, Ivanhoe and Fresno,
diminishing reliance on Arizona as authority to justify federal
displacement of state law.
California unambiguously validated a state role in both acquisition
and distribution, specifically related to reasonable beneficial use, and
strikes inconsistent aspects of the Arizona holding.30
Arizona v. California related only to contractual allocations to users in
Arizona, California, and Nevada from the interstate Lower Colorado River
pursuant to the unique preemptive authority conferred by section 5 of the
BCPA. California v. United States related to the Bureau of Reclamation’s
attempt to obtain unconditional water rights from California on the wholly
intrastate Stanislaus River pursuant to its general authority under the
Reclamation Act of 1902, as limited by section 8, throughout all of the
Western reclamation states. Osias and Hicks ignore this critical distinction.
[2] California affirmed SWRCB authority to impose and condition a
beneficial use requirement on the acquisition of water by [the Bureau of
Reclamation]. Arizona and section 5, therefore, cannot be the basis for
Secretarial authority to impose reasonable, beneficial use restrictions
or deny the role of state law and a state authority over reasonable,
beneficial use disputes.31
The alleged effect of California v. United States on Arizona v. California is a
classic non-sequitur. It seems clear that the holding in California v. United
States that section 8 requires compliance with state law in the acquisition and
distribution of water rights for traditional reclamation projects under the
Reclamation Act of 1902 throughout the West is wholly irrelevant to the
proper interpretation of Arizona v. California. The latter decision held that the
preemptive effect of section 5 of the BCPA was limited to allocation of Lower
Colorado River mainstream water to users in Arizona, California, and Nevada
and establishing terms and conditions for its use.

30. Id. at 1537.
31. Id. at 1537-38.
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[3] Arizona is not authority to supplant applicable California
reasonable, beneficial use law and procedures.32
Again, this statement is plainly erroneous as applied to rights in the
mainstream of the lower Colorado River acquired by users pursuant to BCPA
section 5 contracts for all of the reasons detailed in Arizona v. California. Osias
and Hicks solve that problem by their own contrary interpretation of the BCPA:
The ultimate purpose of the BCPA is to allocate and distribute the
waters of the Colorado River and force the State of California into a
permanent quantified limit for the benefit of California’s uneasy
neighbors. It was not to usurp state authority.33
This argument stubbornly refuses to acknowledge that Arizona v. California
plainly concluded that whatever other aspects of state law might be applicable
to operations under the BCPA,34 Congress determined that the allocation of
Lower Colorado River mainstream water and establishment of the terms and
conditions for its use, of which all agree beneficial use is the most important,
were to be governed solely by section 5 and that state law would “have no
place.” With respect to that critical subject, the Court made it clear that there
is no need to interpret the scope and extent of section 8 vis-à-vis reasonable
beneficial use, since there is no room for supplemental state law, whether or
not it conflicts with the federal preemptive purpose of section 5.
[4] There is no vacuum for federal authority to fill and the Supreme Court has
identified no preemptive basis to do so.35
Where Congress has legislative jurisdiction over a subject matter, such
as the beneficial use of the navigable Lower Colorado River, the fact that
state law may have previously extended to that subject does not deprive
Congress of its legislative authority. There need not be a “vacuum” for
Congress to establish a new, superseding federal rule, as it did in the BCPA.
Moreover, where there is preexisting state law, Congress may preempt such
authority, in whole or part, by specific preemption of the subject by enacting

32. Id. at 1538.
33. Id. at 1535 (emphasis added).
34. “Section 18 plainly allows the States to do things not inconsistent
with the Project Act or with federal control of the river, for example,
regulation of the use of tributary water and protection of present perfected
rights. What other things the States are free to do can be decided when the
occasion arises.” 373 U.S. at 588.
35. Osias and Hicks, supra note 2, at 1538.
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legislation in direct conflict with the state law, or by expressly or impliedly
occupying the field covered by the state law. Arizona v. California fully explains
why the BCPA impliedly occupied the fields of interstate and intrastate
allocation of Lower Colorado River mainstream water and the terms and
conditions for its use.
III. The Attack on the Validity and Enforcement of the Part 417
Regulations
A. The BCPA Regulations
Osias and Hicks concede that “BCPA section 5 explicitly authorized the
Secretary to adopt regulations regarding contracts for the storage and
delivery of [Lower Colorado River mainstream] water.”36 However, that
concession is rendered meaningless by their restrictive qualification that the
authorization may not be exercised to establish and enforce reasonable
beneficial use obligations on the use of such water:
The adoption of federal reasonable, beneficial use standards and a
process to adjudicate compliance is a radical departure from historical
state, judicial, and contractual provisions and cannot be implied from
the statutory language granting the Secretary a general power to adopt
necessary regulations.37
Osias and Hicks again simply disagree with the plain language of the
Court’s opinion, supra:
The general authority to make contracts normally includes the power to
choose with whom and upon what terms the contracts will be made.38
A concomitant implied duty of the Secretary was obviously to enforce his
contracts, as the Secretary made clear in IID’s 1932 contract, at page 211-212
infra. As to the “radical” power conferred upon the Secretary by the BCPA,
which the Court in Arizona v. California found reasonably implied in the statutory
scheme, it stemmed from the unprecedented scope and purposes of that Act.
Osias and Hicks also assert that the fact that section 5 also provides
that water delivery contracts are to be for “permanent service . . . strongly
undercuts any hint of a Secretarial role to deny water deliveries or reallocate

36. Id. at 1555.
37. Id. at 1556.
38. 373 U.S. at 579-80.
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water inconsistent with permanent contractual authority.”39 Their argument
would preclude the Secretary from reducing water deliveries for a
contractor’s failure to honor its contractual commitments for as long as they
are not complied with. This exercise of contractual enforcement is not a
permanent “reallocation.” The Osias and Hicks interpretation would permit
IID, having accepted numerous conditions to obtain a water delivery
contract, including a commitment to make reasonable beneficial use of such
water, to ignore those obligations and leave the Secretary powerless to
enforce them by temporarily reducing deliveries to the amount actually put
to such use.40 “Permanent service” plainly means no more than that the
contract is not a fixed term contract and will continue in perpetuity until
changed voluntarily or by Congress.
Osias and Hicks next track (1) the promulgation of the Secretary’s 1930
“General Regulations” implementing the key requirements of the BCPA,
including the section 5 contracting authority and reserving “the right . . . to
amend or extend these regulations from time to time consistently with [the
Colorado River] compact and the laws of Congress, as the public need may
require,” and (2) the development of the Seven Party Agreement establishing
the respective priorities agreed to by the California users and recommended
by the California Division of Water Resources to the Secretary for inclusion in
the regulations and the California water delivery contracts. The entitlements
of each party were and remain limited to “beneficial consumptive use.”41
Incorporation of the State recommendations in the Secretary’s regulations
necessarily made them federal regulations.
B. The Part 417 Regulations
Article 24 of IID’s 1932 water delivery contract contains a broad
reservation of the Secretary’s “right to prescribe and enforce rules and regulations
not inconsistent with this contract, governing the diversion and delivery of water
hereunder to the district and to other contractors.”42 Osias and Hicks
disparage the Secretary’s later promulgation of the Part 417 regulations in
1969 and 1972 following the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. California,

39. Osias and Hicks, supra note 2, at 1523.
40. Osias and Hicks spend 12 pages demonstrating that the California
legislature, courts and Water Resources Control Board have a long history of
reducing permitted or decreed state water rights for failure to put the
permitted quantities to reasonable beneficial use. Id. at 1538-50. Although
this history is irrelevant to the scope of the Secretary’s authority under the
BCPA, it reflects a parallel enforcement program under state law.
41. Id. at 1557-58.
42. Id. at 1559 (emphasis added).
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but do not assert that the Secretary failed to comply with applicable
rulemaking procedures or that IID objected to their validity in any way:
In 1969, the Secretary opportunistically filled the partial vacuum of
diminished state authority created in the wake of the Arizona decision.
The Secretary issued a seemingly innocuous notice in the Federal
Register promulgating “new” procedures for Colorado River water
delivery under contracts. These new procedures related to conservation
practices in the “diversion, delivery, distribution, and use of the
Colorado River” so that deliveries not “exceed that reasonably required
for beneficial use.” The Secretary’s notice cited the BCPA, the contracts
for the storage and delivery of Colorado River water made pursuant to
the BCPA, and the Decree of the Supreme Court in Arizona as the
enabling authorities for proposed part 417. In 1972, the Secretary
posted an intermediate revision which, again, cited the BCPA, the
contracts and the Decree enabling authorities.
Notably, none of the enabling sources contain an express authorization by Congress
to the Secretary to act as a reasonable, beneficial use adjudicator.43
The foregoing assertion is disingenuous at best.
Express provisions of the cited authorities collectively authorize the
Secretary to establish and enforce reasonable beneficial use of the
contractual allocations, even though they do not characterize the Secretary’s
role as “adjudicator,” although the Administrative Procedure Act generically
does so.44 Section 5 of the BCPA expressly authorized the Secretary to contract

43. Id. at 1560 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
44. 5 U.S.C. § 551 contains the following relevant definitions:
(6)“Order” means the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether
affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency
in a matter other than rule making but including licensing;
(7)“Adjudication” means agency process for the formulation of an
order;
(8)“License” includes the whole or a part of an agency permit . . . or
other form of permission;
(9)“Licensing” includes agency process respecting the . . . limitation
[or] amendment . . . of a license;
Section 5 of the BCPA provides that “no person shall have or be entitled to
have the use for any purpose of the water stored as aforesaid except by
contract made as herein stated.” Hence, since a section 5 contract is
required for an entitlement to BCPA water, it is clearly a “license” within the
APA definition, the Secretary’s process for formulating an “order” imposing a
“limitation” on IID’s contract was an “adjudication” and the Secretary an
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for the storage and delivery of Lower Colorado River water “under such
general regulations as he may prescribe,” which he promulgated in 1930.45
The entitlements of the California users adopted by the Secretary in his 1930
regulations and incorporated into each California water delivery contract
expressly specified “beneficial consumptive use” as the limiting measure of
each entitlement and IID’s 1932 water delivery contract also included an
express reservation of ‘the right to preserve and enforce rules and regulations not
inconsistent with this contract.”46 Finally, Arizona v. California expressly held
that section 5 authorized the Secretary to establish the conditions for use of
the Lower Colorado River without any exceptions, subject to satisfaction of
present perfected rights under section 6.47
C. The Breach of Contract and Due Process Issues
Osias and Hicks contend that the Secretary’s 2002 determination and
proposed 2003 redetermination were invalid because (1) IID’s 1932 contract
provides that disputes under the contract are to be resolved either by
arbitration or a court in the first instance, not by the Secretary, and (2) that
IID was denied procedural due process in the informal adjudication of the
extent to which it was making reasonable beneficial use of its contract
entitlement.48 The short answer to both claims is that IID received judicial
review of the Secretary’s action and that the district court agreed with IID’s
due process claim in setting aside the 2002 determination and remanding
the matter for redetermination.49 But that is a wholly different issue from
whether the Secretary has the authority to promulgate and enforce the Part
417 regulations relating to IID’s obligation to make reasonable beneficial use
of deliveries under its contract, as to which there can be no reasonable

authorized “adjudicator.” The final “adjudication,” of course, is by a federal
court from which an aggrieved party may seek review of a Secretarial order,
just as an aggrieved party may seek state court relief from a California Water
Resources Control Board “adjudication.”
45. Elsewhere, Osias and Hicks complain that section 5 contains “no
express authority [which] instructs the Secretary to make either annual
intrastate water use allocations or annual reasonable beneficial use
adjudications,” supra note 2 at p. 1523, seemingly suggesting that the
Secretary’s use of such procedures is ultra vires and that the Seven Party
Agreement was unnecessary.
46. Id. at 1559 (emphasis added).
47. 373 U.S. at 564-65, 584.
48. Osias and Hicks, supra note 2, at 1501, 1562-65, 1576-77.
49. Order Remanding Action, supra note 5.
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doubt, even though final judicial adjudication of the issue must await
another day.
IV.

Conclusion

Osias and Hicks assert that the purpose of their article is to establish
that the Secretary of the Interior’s actions in 2002 and 2003 enforcing the
reasonable beneficial use limitations in IID’s Colorado River water delivery
contract issued under section 5 of the Boulder Canyon project Act “lacked
legal foundation, contract compliance, and adjudicatory due process [and]
should not be regarded as valid precedent.”50
This rebuttal article demonstrates that the 80 page argument offered by
Osias and Hicks in support of their contentions either misreads or distorts
the Supreme Court’s controlling decision in Arizona v. California, and other
relevant Supreme Court decisions. It also ignores the language of the
Secretarial documents governing IID’s contract entitlement, as well as
applicable principles of administrative law. Consequently, the contentions
of Osias and Hicks should be given little, if any, weight should this dispute
resurface in the future.

50. Osias and Hicks, supra note 2, at 1501.
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